THE ORIGIN OF THE TALIBANS

The Taliban—from the Arabic word for "student,"  Talib—are fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, mostly from Afghanistan’s Pashtun tribes. The Taliban dominates large swaths of Afghanistan and a large part of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, semi-autonomous tribal lands along the Afghan-Pakistan border that serve as training grounds for terrorists.

The Taliban seek to establish a puritanical caliphate that neither recognizes nor tolerates forms of Islam divergent from their own. They scorn democracy or any secular or pluralistic political process as an offense against Islam. The Taliban’s Islam, however, a close kin of Saudi Arabian Wahhabism, is far more perversion than interpretation. The Taliban’s version of Sharia, or Islamic law, is historically inaccurate, contradictory, self-serving and fundamentally deviant from prevailing interpretations of Islamic law and practice.

Origins

There was no such thing as the Taliban until Afghanistan’s civil war in the wake of the Soviet Union's troop withdrawal in 1989 after a decade-long occupation. But by the time their last troops withdrew in February of that year, they’d left a nation in social and economic shards, 1.5 million dead, millions of refugees and orphans in Iran and Pakistan, and a gaping political vacuum that warlords attempted to fill. Afghan mujahideen warlords replaced their war with the Soviets with a civil war.

Thousands of Afghan orphans grew up never knowing Afghanistan or their parents, especially their mothers. They were schooled in Pakistan’s madrassas, religious schools that, in this case, were encouraged and financed by Pakistani and Saudi authorities to develop militantly inclined Islamists. Pakistan nurtured that corps of militants as proxy fighters in Pakistan’s ongoing conflict over Muslim-dominated (and disputed) Kashmir. But Pakistan consciously intended to use the madrassas’ militants as leverage in its attempt to control Afghanistan as well.

As Jeri Laber of Human Rights Watch wrote in the New York Review of Books of the origins of the Taliban in refugee camps (recalling an article he’d written in 1986):

Hundreds of thousands of youths, who knew nothing of life but the bombings that destroyed their homes and drove them to seek refuge over the border, were being raised to hate and to fight, “in the spirit of Jihad,” a “holy war” that would restore Afghanistan to its people. “New kinds of Afghans are being born in the struggle,” I reported. “Caught in the midst of a grownups’ war, the young Afghans are under intense political pressure from one side or another, almost from birth." [...] The children that I interviewed and wrote about in 1986 are now young adults. Many are now with the Taliban.

Mullah Omar and the Taliban's Rise in Afghanistan

As civil war was ravaging Afghanistan, Afghans were desperate for a stabilizing counterforce that would put an end to the violence.

The Taliban’s most original aims were, as Ahmed Rashid, the Pakistani journalist and author of "Taliban" (2000), wrote, to “restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan."

As most of them were part-time or full-time students at madrassas, the name they chose for themselves was natural. A Talib is one who seeks knowledge, compared to the mullah who is one who gives knowledge. By choosing such a name, the Taliban (plural of Talib) distanced themselves from the party politics of the mujahideen and signaled that they were a movement for cleansing society rather than a party trying to grab power.​

For their leader in Afghanistan, the Taliban turned to Mullah Mohammed Omar, an itinerant preacher likely born in 1959 in Nodeh village near Kandahar, in southeastern Afghanistan. He had neither tribe nor religious pedigree. He had fought the Soviets and been wounded four times, including once in the eye. His reputation was that of a pious ascetic.

Omar's reputation grew when he ordered a group of Taliban militants to arrest a warlord who had captured two teenage girls and raped them. The 30 Talibs, with just 16 rifles between them—or so goes the story, one of many near-mythical accounts that have grown around Omar’s history—attacked the commander’s base, freed the girls and hanged the commander by their favorite means: from the barrel of a tank, in full view, as an example of Taliban justice.

The Taliban’s reputation grew through similar feats.

Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's Intelligence Services and the Taliban

Religious indoctrination in Pakistan’s madrassas and Omar’s campaigns against rapists alone were not the light that lit the Taliban fuse. The Pakistani intelligence services, known as the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI); the Pakistani military; and Benazir Bhutto, who was prime minister of Pakistan during the Taliban’s most politically and militarily formative years (1993-96), all saw in the Taliban a proxy army they could manipulate to Pakistan’s ends.

In 1994, Bhutto’s government appointed the Taliban as protector of Pakistani convoys through Afghanistan. Controlling trade routes and the lucrative windfalls those routes provide in Afghanistan is a major source of lucre and power. The Taliban proved uniquely effective, swiftly defeating other warlords and conquering major Afghan cities.

Beginning in 1994, the Taliban rose to power and established their brutal, totalitarian rule over 90 percent of the country, in part by leading a genocidal campaign against Afghanistan’s Shiite, or Hazara.

The Taliban and the Clinton Administration

Following Pakistan’s lead, then-President Bill Clinton's administration initially supported the Taliban’s rise. Clinton’s judgment was clouded by the question that has often led American policy astray in the region: Who can best check Iran’s influence? In the 1980s, then-President Ronald Reagan's administration armed and financed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein under the assumption that a totalitarian Iraq was more acceptable than an unbridled, Islamic Iran. The policy backfired in the form of two wars.

In the 1980s, the Reagan administration also funded the mujahideen in Afghanistan as well as their Islamist supporters in Pakistan. That blowback took the form of al-Qaeda. As the Soviets withdrew and the cold war ended, American support for Afghan mujahideen stopped abruptly, but military and diplomatic support for Afghanistan did not. Under the influence of Benazir Bhutto, the Clinton administration voiced itself willing to open a dialogue with the Taliban in the mid-1990s, especially as the Taliban was the only force in Afghanistan capable of guaranteeing another American interest in the region—potential oil pipelines.

On Sept. 27, 1996, Glyn Davies, a US State Department spokesman, expressed hope that the Taliban “will move quickly to restore order and security and to form a representative interim government that can begin the process of reconciliation nationwide.” Davies called the Taliban’s execution of former Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah merely “regrettable,” and said the United States would send diplomats to Afghanistan to meet with the Taliban, potentially to re-establishing full diplomatic ties. The Clinton administration’s flirtation with the Taliban did not last, however, as Madeleine Albright, incensed by the Taliban’s treatment of women, among other regressive measures, halted it when she became the US secretary of state in January 1997.

The Taliban's Repressions and Regressions: A War on Women

The Taliban's long lists of edicts and decrees took an especially misogynistic view of women. Schools for girls were closed. Women were forbidden to work or leave their homes without verifiable permission. Wearing non-Islamic dress was forbidden. Wearing makeup and sporting Western products like purses or shoes was forbidden. Music, dancing, cinemas, and all nonreligious broadcasting and entertainment were banned. Lawbreakers were beaten, flogged, shot or beheaded.

In 1994, Osama bin Laden moved to Kandahar as a guest of Mullah Omar. On Aug. 23, 1996, bin Laden declared war on the United States and exerted increasing influence on Omar, helping to fund the Taliban’s offensives against other warlords in the north of the country. That lavish financial support made it impossible for Mullah Omar not to protect bin Laden when Saudi Arabia, then the United States, pressured the Taliban to extradite bin Laden. The fates and ideology of al-Qaeda and the Taliban became intertwined.

At the height of their power, in March 2001, the Taliban demolished two enormous, centuries-old Buddha statues in Bamiyan, an act that showed to the world in ways that the Taliban’s wanton massacres and oppression should have much earlier the ruthless, distorted Puritanism of the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam.

The Taliban's 2001 Downfall

The Taliban was overthrown in the 2001 American-backed invasion of Afghanistan, shortly after bin Laden and al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The Taliban were never completely defeated, however. They retreated and regrouped, especially in Pakistan, and today hold much of southern and western Afghanistan. Bin Laden was killed in 2011 in a raid by US Navy Seals in his hideout in Pakistan after a nearly decade-long manhunt. The Afghan government claimed that Mullah Omar died in a hospital in Karachi in 2013. 

Today, the Taliban claim senior religious cleric Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada as their new leader. They released a letter in January 2017 to newly elected US President Donald Trump to withdraw all remaining US forces from Afghanistan.

The Pakistani Taliban (known as the TTP, the same group that almost succeeded in blowing up an SUV full of explosives in Times Square in 2010) is just as powerful. They are virtually immune from Pakistani law and authority; they continue to strategize against the NATO-American presence in Afghanistan and against Pakistan’s secular rulers; and they are tactically directing attacks elsewhere in the world. ​

source:thoughtco

ORIGIN OF THE MUJAHIDEENS IN BRIEF

In the 1970s, a new group of fighters arose in Afghanistan. They called themselves mujahideen, a word applied initially to Afghan fighters who opposed the push of the British Raj into Afghanistan in the 19th century. But who were these 20th-century mujahideen?

The word "mujahideen" comes from the same Arabic root as jihad, which means "struggle." Thus, a mujahid is someone who struggles or someone who fights. In the context of Afghanistan during the late 20th century, the mujahideen were Islamic warriors defending their country from the Soviet Union, which invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and fought a bloody war there for a decade.

Who Were the Mujahideen?

Afghanistan's mujahideen were an exceptionally diverse lot, including ethnic Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and others. Some were Shi'a Muslims, sponsored by Iran, while most factions were made up of Sunni Muslims. In addition to the Afghan fighters, Muslims from other countries volunteered to join the mujahideen ranks. Much smaller numbers of Arabs (including Osama bin Laden), fighters from Chechnya, and others rushed to the aid of Afghanistan. After all, the Soviet Union was officially an atheist nation, inimical to Islam, and the Chechens had their own anti-Soviet grievances.

The mujahideen arose out of local militias, led by regional warlords, who independently took up arms all across Afghanistan to fight the Soviet invasion. Coordination among the different mujahideen factions was severely limited by mountainous terrain, linguistic differences, and traditional rivalries among different ethnic groups.

As the Soviet occupation dragged on, the Afghan resistance became increasingly united in its opposition. By 1985, the majority of the mujahideen were fighting as part of a broad alliance known as the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen. This alliance was made up of troops from the armies of seven major warlords, so it was also known as the Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance or the Peshawar Seven.

The most famous (and likely most effective) of the mujahideen commanders was Ahmed Shah Massoud, known as the "Lion of the Panjshir."

 His troops fought under the banner of the Jamiat-i-Islami, one of the Peshawar Seven factions led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, who would later become the 10th President of Afghanistan. Massoud was a strategic and tactical genius, and his mujahideen were a crucial part of the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1980s.

The Soviet-Afghan War

For a variety of reasons, foreign governments also supported the mujahideen in the war against the Soviets. The United States had been engaged in detente with the Soviets, but their expansionist move into Afghanistan angered President Jimmy Carter, and the U.S. would go on to supply money and arms to the mujahideen through intermediaries in Pakistan for the duration of the conflict. (The U.S. was still smarting from its loss in the Vietnam War, so the country did not send in any combat troops.) The People's Republic of China also supported the mujahideen, as did Saudi Arabia.

The Afghan mujahideen deserve the lion's share of the credit for their victory over the Red Army. Armed with their knowledge of the mountainous terrain, their tenacity, and their sheer unwillingness to allow a foreign army to overrun Afghanistan, small bands of often ill-equipped mujahideen fought one of the world's superpowers to a draw. In 1989, the Soviets were forced to withdraw in disgrace, having lost 15,000 troops.

For the Soviets, it was a very costly mistake. Some historians cite the expense and discontent over the Afghan War as a major factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union several years later. For Afghanistan, it was also a bittersweet victory; more than 1 million Afghans were killed, and the war threw the country into a state of political chaos that eventually allowed the fundamentalist Taliban to take power in Kabul.

Source: thoughtco

HOW INDIA MAY RESPOND TO KASHMIR ATTACK

As tensions run high between
India and
Pakistan in the wake of a terror attack on Indian paramilitary personnel in the border state of Jammu and
Kashmir, Islamabad has written to the United Nations seeking its intervention to “defuse tensions” with New Delhi.
The attack, on February 14, killed at least 41 troopers of India’s Central Reserve Police Force and has led to a major row between the neighbouring countries, especially after Pakistan-based
Islamist militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) claimed responsibility.

It has also laid bare deep rifts in the bilateral relationship, which had started on a bright note under the government of Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, when he invited the heads of state of all countries within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to his inauguration in May 2014.

Since then, ties have gone progressively downhill, due to a string of attacks by Pakistan-based terror outfits in places like
Gurdaspur, Udhampur,
Uri, at the
Pathankot Air Force Station and elsewhere in India.

However,
this latest attack in Pulwama may just be the straw that broke the camel’s back. It has been squarely condemned by countries around the world, many of whom share New Delhi’s sense of outrage.


So, what options does the Indian government have in response? First, there are a range of diplomatic options. New Delhi has already withdrawn Pakistan’s most favoured nation status, which will increase tariffs on Pakistani goods imported into India – valued at about US$488.5 million in 2017-18.

Second, military options are also on the table. These could include a surgical or targeted strike against
terrorist bases, or an air strike by Indian fighter jets - even from within Indian territory - on selected terrorist targets.
Third, another option is to ratchet up pressure on Pakistan and other countries, such as
Iran and
Afghanistan, which have also been on the receiving end of attacks by terror outfits operating out of Pakistan.

Meanwhile, in a significant gesture,
US National Security Adviser John Bolton has said on the record that Washington supports “India’s right to self-defence” against cross-border terrorism. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also said on Twitter: “We stand with India as it confronts terrorism. Pakistan must not provide safe haven for terrorists to threaten international security.”

Indian soldiers examine the aftermath of the explosion in Pulwama. Photo: Reuters

There are some who opine that India may walk out of the
Indus Waters Treaty, which was signed by the two neighbours in September 1960. While this would create problems for Pakistan, it could also backfire on India diplomatically as it would be seen as a case of New Delhi having unilaterally withdrawn from a treaty that was mutually agreed upon. This could also be used by extremist elements within Pakistan to whip up anti-India sentiment.India is also trying to get Pakistan blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force – an inter-governmental body established in July 1989 to combat money laundering. Pakistan is already on the organisation’s watch list and would join the likes of 

North Korea and
Iran if it gets blacklisted.

DOMESTIC COMPULSIONS


The attack in Pulwama outraged the entire country, given its horrific nature. However, what New Delhi chooses to do now will depend on a host of factors, both within the country and outside it.


Modi, speaking at an event after the attack, said: “I know there is deep anger, your blood boils looking at what has happened. At this moment, there are expectations and the feelings of a strong response which is quite natural. We have given full freedom to the security forces.”
India goes to the polls in May, putting Modi’s government under pressure to take a decisive stand. In the aftermath of a terror attack in Uri on September 18, 2016, New Delhi ordered
surgical strikes against terror launch pads – an operation that later inspired a hugely successful
Bollywood film.

FINANCIAL WOES
Pakistan’s economy is in a precarious state – the country is thought to have less than US$8 billion in foreign exchange reserves and recently received promises of
US$20 billion in investments during a visit by Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of
Saudi Arabia. However, India’s ties with Saudi Arabia have also seen steady improvement of late, with the two countries planning a US$44 billion refinery in the Indian state of Maharashtra.
That being said, New Delhi’s efforts to get JeM leader Maulana Masood Azhar listed as a global terrorist by the
United Nations were delivered a blow when Pakistan and Saudi Arabia issued a joint statement during the crown prince’s visit objecting to the “politicisation” of UN procedures.

Soon after Thursday’s attack, Jaish released photographs and a video of Adil Ahmad Dar, a young Kashmiri villager it said had carried out the suicide attack on the convoy as it passed through Pulwama district.



In the video, Dar warned of more attacks to avenge human rights violations in Kashmir.


Indian forces picked up seven people for questioning, after mounting a sweep in Pulwama, a police official said.


The bus in which the paramilitary personnel were travelling was part of a convoy of more than 70 vehicles on the heavily guarded Jammu-Srinagar highway.


Jammu and Kashmir Governor Satya Pal Malik said there were security lapses and authorities are investigating why such a large convoy, transporting nearly 2,500 security personnel, was on the road.


The last major attack in Kashmir was in 2016 when militants raided an Indian army camp in Uri, killing 20 soldiers. Modi responded with a surgical strike on suspected militant camps across the border in Pakistan Kashmir weeks later.

The White House urged Pakistan in a statement “to end immediately the support and safe haven provided to all terrorist groups operating on its soil”. It said the attack strengthens US resolve to step up counterterrorism cooperation with India.

NIGERIA ARMY 78RI LIST FOR SCREENING IS FINALLY OUT.

Nigerian Army Releases List of Successfully selected candidates for 78 RRI Pre-Screening Exercise.

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